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As the oil tanker M/T Athos I neared Paulsboro, New Jersey, 
after a journey from Venezuela, an abandoned ship anchor lay 
hidden on the bottom of the Delaware River squarely within the 
Athos I‘s path and only 900 feet away from its berth.  Although 
dozens of ships had docked since the anchor was deposited in the 
River, none had reported encountering it.  The Athos I struck the 
anchor, which punctured the ship‘s hull and caused approximately 
263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the River.  The cleanup 
following the casualty was successful, but expensive.   
This appeal is the result of three interested parties 
attempting to apportion the monetary liability.  The first party 
(actually two entities consolidated as one for our purposes) 
includes the Athos I‘s owner, Frescati Shipping Company, Ltd., and 
its manager, Tsakos Shipping & Trading, S.A. (jointly and 
severally, ―Frescati‖).  Although Frescati states that the spill caused 
it to pay out $180 million in cleanup costs and ship damages, it was 
reimbursed for nearly $88 million of that amount by the United 
States (the ―Government‖)—the second interested party—pursuant 
to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.  In order 
to recoup the unreimbursed losses, Frescati made claims in contract 
and tort against the third interested party—a set of affiliates known 
as CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, CITGO Petroleum 
Corporation, and CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation (jointly and 
severally, ―CARCO‖)—which requested the oil shipped on the 
Athos I and owned the marine terminal where it was to dock to 
unload its oil.  Specifically, Frescati brought a contract claim for 
CARCO‘s alleged breach of the safe port/safe berth warranty 
(jointly and severally, ―safe berth warranty‖) it made to an 
intermediary—Star Tankers, Inc.—responsible for chartering the 
Athos I to CARCO‘s port, and alleged negligence and negligent 
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misrepresentation against CARCO as the owner of the wharf the 
Athos I was nearing when it was holed.  The Government, as a 
statutory subrogee that stepped into Frescati‘s position for the $88 
million it reimbursed to Frescati under the Oil Pollution Act, has 
limited its claim for reimbursement from CARCO to Frescati‘s 
contractual claim pursuant to a limited settlement agreement.  
 Following a 41-day bench trial, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that CARCO was not liable 
for the accident under any of these theories.  The Court, however, 
made no separate findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1).  That calls 
for a remand to set out these mandated matters.  However, for the 
sake of efficiency, we discuss—and, to the extent necessary, make 
holdings on—the legal issues appealed.     
In regard to the contractual safe berth warranty, the Court 
determined that Frescati (and the Government as a subrogee) could 
not recover on their contractual claims.  First, Frescati was not a 
party to the agreement that contained the warranty between 
CARCO and Star Tankers, and was not an intended beneficiary of 
that agreement.  Furthermore, even if Frescati could claim the 
protection of the warranty, it was only a promise by CARCO to 
exercise due diligence and not an unconditional guarantee; 
moreover, sufficient diligence existed here.  In any event, the 
warranty was excused because CARCO specified the port ahead of 
the Athos I‘s arrival, placing the burden on the Athos I‘s captain to 
accept it as safe or reject it under what is called the ―named port 
exception.‖   
For reasons elaborated below, we disagree with all three of 
these rulings.  Instead, we hold that the Athos I—and by extension, 
its owner, Frescati—was an implied beneficiary of CARCO‘s safe 
berth warranty.  We conclude as well that the safe berth warranty is 
an express assurance of safety, and that the named port exception 
to that warranty does not apply to hazards that are unknown to the 
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parties and not reasonably foreseeable.  We cannot be sure, 
however, that this warranty was actually breached, as the District 
Court made no finding as to the Athos I‘s actual draft nor the 
amount of clearance actually provided.     
If on remand the District Court rules in favor of Frescati on 
its contractual warranty claim, its negligence claim becomes 
unnecessary.  If this issue is reached, we do not agree with the 
District Court‘s conclusion that CARCO cannot be liable in 
negligence because the anchor lay outside the approach to 
CARCO‘s terminal—the area in which CARCO had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in proving a safe approach.  As such, the 
District Court would need to resolve the appropriate standard of 
care required, whether CARCO breached that standard, and if so, 
whether any such breach caused the accident.  Conversely, we find 
no error with the Court‘s holding that CARCO‘s alleged 
misrepresentation as to the depth of its berth was geographically 
(and hence factually) irrelevant to the ultimate accident.  In 
addition, we conclude that the Government has waived reliance on 
a partial settlement agreement with CARCO that, the Government 
contends, precludes CARCO from making certain equitable 
defenses to the Government‘s subrogation claims.  In this context, 
we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part for additional 
factfinding on the contractual (and possibly negligence) claims. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background  
A.   The Tanker and Its Charters 
At the heart of this dispute is the Athos I, a single-hulled oil 
tanker measuring 748 feet long and more than 105 feet wide.  It 
was owned by Frescati at all relevant times.  At the time of the 
accident, however, the Athos I had been chartered into a tanker 
pool assembled by Star Tankers, who is not a party to this 
consolidated action.  In order to transport a load of heavy crude oil 
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from Venezuela to its asphalt refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey, 
CARCO sub-chartered the Athos I from the Star Tankers pool.       
In admiralty, these contracts for service are known as 
―charter parties.‖1  In specific regard to Star Tankers, the Athos I 
was enlisted into the tanker pool in October of 2001 pursuant to a  
―time charter party.‖  ―Under a time charter, the owner [Frescati] 
remains responsible for the navigation and operation of the vessel 
and the charterer [Star Tankers] assumes responsibility for 
arranging for the employment of the vessel, providing fuel and 
paying for certain cargo-related expenses.‖  Terence Coghlin et al., 
Time Charters ¶ 1.59 (6th ed. 2008).  The time charter party gave 
Star Tankers, an intermediary or ―middleman,‖ the right to sub-
charter the Athos I although Frescati remained responsible for 
keeping the vessel staffed and serviceable.  
In contrast, CARCO‘s employment of the Athos I for the 
specific voyage was pursuant to a ―voyage charter party‖ with Star 
Tankers.  Unlike a time charter party in which a ―vessel‘s 
employment is put under the orders of . . . charterers‖ for a period 
of time, under a voyage charter party the ship is hired ―to perform 
one or more designated voyages in return for the payment of 
freight.‖2  Julian Cooke et al., Voyage Charters ¶ 1.1 (3d ed. 2007).  
                                              
1
 The term ―charter party‖ may be confusing in that it does not refer 
to an entity, but a document.  This is due to its historical genesis, 
deriving from the phrase ―charta partita, i.e., a deed of writing 
divided.‖  Black’s Law Dictionary 268 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting 
Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty in a Nutshell 44–45 (3d ed. 1996)).  
The charta partita was literally a divided document, the owner and 
the charterer each retaining one half of the agreement.  Id.   
 
2
 It has been observed that 
[t]he fundamental difference between voyage and 
time charters is how the freight or ―charter hire‖ is 
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CARCO‘s particular voyage charter party, based on a standard 
industry ASBATANKVOY form, contained what are customarily 
known as ―safe port‖ and ―safe berth‖ warranties (already defined, 
for convenience, as a ―safe berth warranty‖).  It provided that  
[t]he vessel . . . shall, with all convenient dispatch, 
proceed as ordered to Loading Port(s) named . . . , or 
so near thereunto as she may safely get (always 
afloat), . . . and being so loaded shall forthwith 
proceed, as ordered on signing Bills of Lading, direct 
to the Discharging Port(s), or so near thereunto as she 
may safely get (always afloat), and deliver said 
cargo.   
J.A. at 1222 (Tanker Voyage Charter Party, Part II, ¶ 1).  It further 
directed that ―[t]he vessel shall load and discharge at any safe place 
or wharf, . . . which shall be designated and procured by the 
Charterer [CARCO], provided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie 
at, and depart therefrom always safely afloat . . . .‖  Id. at 1222 
(Tanker Voyage Charter Party, Part II, ¶ 9).  We note that, in the 
time charter party between Frescati and Star Tankers, the latter 
contracted to provide a similar safe berth warranty, but this 
warranty was qualified whereby Star Tankers obligated itself to 
exercise ―due diligence to ensure that the vessel is only employed 
between and at safe places . . . .‖  Id. at 1157 (Time Charter Party 
                                                                                                              
calculated.  A voyage charterparty specifies the 
amount due for carrying a specified cargo on a 
specified voyage (or series of voyages), regardless of 
how long a particular voyage takes.  A time 
charterparty specifies the amount due for each day 
that the vessel is ―on hire,‖ regardless of how many 
voyages are completed.   
David W. Robertson et al., Admiralty and Maritime Law in the 
United States 335 (2d ed. 2008).   
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¶ 4).  Following the accident, Frescati began arbitration with Star 
Tankers regarding its claims for damage of the Athos I, but that 
proceeding has been stayed pending the outcome of this case.  Oral 
Arg. Tr. 4:8–15, Sept. 20, 2012.         
 In preparation for the arrival in Paulsboro of the Athos I, its 
master
3
 was provided with a copy of CARCO‘s Port Manual.  This 
Manual indicated that the allowable maximum draft at the 
Paulsboro facility was 38 feet, but that this ―may change from time 
to time and should be verified prior to the vessel‘s arrival.‖  J.A. at 
1095 (CITGO Terminal Regulations for Vessels ¶ 2).  On 
November 22, 2004, four days before the Athos I arrived, CARCO 
reduced this maximum draft to 36 feet.  The Athos I was not 
informed of this modification. 
B.   The Accident  
 On November 26, 2004, the Athos I was nearing its ultimate 
destination, CARCO‘s asphalt refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey.  
When the Athos I reached the mouth of the Delaware River, only 
80 miles remained of its 1,900-mile journey.  Although Captain 
Iosif Markoutsis was the ship‘s master, the seven-hour upriver 
transit was aided by Delaware River Pilot Captain Howard Teal.  
At approximately 8:30 p.m., while the Athos I was still navigating 
up the River channel, Docking Pilot Captain Joseph Bethel boarded 
the vessel (Captain Bethel was employed by non-party Moran 
Towing of Pennsylvania).  The Docking Pilot relieved the River 
Pilot at about 8:40 p.m.   
 CARCO‘s Paulsboro facility sits on a jetty on the New 
Jersey side of the Delaware River.  Federal Anchorage Number 
Nine (―the Anchorage‖ or ―Anchorage Number Nine‖) separates 
the River channel from CARCO‘s port waters.  As pictured in 
                                              
3
 A ship‘s master is its commander and captain.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary, supra, at 1065. 
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Appendix A to this opinion, the Anchorage‘s border runs 
diagonally to CARCO‘s waterfront, ranging between 130 and 670 
feet from the face of its ship dock.  Across the Anchorage, the 
River Channel begins less than 2,000 feet from CARCO‘s berth, a 
little more than two-and-a-half lengths of the Athos I.  Customarily, 
a tanker of the Athos I‘s size would come up the River, make a 
starboard (right) 180 turn into the Anchorage, and would then be 
pushed sideways by tugs (i.e., parallel parked) into CARCO‘s pier.  
The Athos I was following this procedure when, at 9:02 p.m., it 
suddenly listed to the port (left) side, and oil became visible in the 
water.  It was later determined that an abandoned anchor had 
punched two holes in the Athos I‘s hull, causing (as already noted) 
roughly 263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the River.  At the 
time of the allision,
4
 the Athos I was only 900 feet from CARCO‘s 
berth, approximately halfway through the Anchorage.  The tide was 
relatively low at the time of the accident after having reached its 
lowest point only 50 minutes prior.  J.A. at 2102.   
The anchor was eventually exhumed.  Inspection revealed 
that it weighed roughly nine tons and measured 6ʹ8ʺ long, 7ʹ3ʺ 
wide, and 4ʹ6ʺ high.  J.A. at 2192 (United States Coast Guard 
Marine Casualty Investigation Report).  The Coast Guard further 
reported that the anchor was ultimately found lying prone with its 
blade reaching 54 inches above the floor of the River.  Id. at 2196.  
Although the District Court made no finding of fact as to the exact 
position of the anchor at the time of the allision, it found persuasive 
the testimony of oceanographer and ocean engineer Dr. Peter 
Traykovski,  who opined that the anchor was lying horizontal at the 
time of the accident with a height of only 41 inches above the 
bottom of the River.  Traykovski Test., 24:25–25:13, Nov. 4, 2010.  
The Court also did not make any finding as to the depth of the 
                                              
4
 An allision is ―[t]he contact of a vessel with a stationary object 
such as an anchored vessel or a pier.‖  Black’s Law Dictionary, 
supra, at 88.   
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Anchorage where the anchor lay, though the record before us 
seems to indicate that the depth was between 40.3 and 41.45 feet 
deep at low tide.  Id. at 49:12–25; J.A. at 2196.    
The District Court also did not make any finding as to the 
draft of the Athos I—that is, the distance between the lowest point 
of the ship and the waterline—but assumed, for purposes of 
analysis, that it was drafting at 36ʹ7ʺ as represented by Frescati at 
the time of the accident.  The Court also failed to resolve the 
anchor‘s depth or position, although it noted that there was 
―persuasive evidence‖ that the anchor was lying down at the time 
of the accident.  In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., Nos. 05-CV-
00305-JF, 08-cv-02898-JF, 2011 WL 1436878, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 12, 2011).   The parties, however, stipulated that the anchor 
had been in the same approximate location for at least three years 
because it was detectable from a sonar scan performed by the 
University of Delaware in 2001 as part of an independent 
geophysical study.
5
  The owner of the anchor has never been 
determined, but the Court speculated that the anchor likely was 
used for dredging operations at the time it was lost.   
C.   The Cost of the Accident  
Frescati claims that the accident cost it, as the ―responsible 
party‖ under the Oil Pollution Act, approximately $180 million in 
clean-up costs and damages to the ship.  (The Act was passed in the 
wake of the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989, and was designed to 
facilitate oil spill cleanups by requiring ―responsible parties‖ to pay 
initially for removal costs and damages.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).)  
Because the Act sets liability limits for cooperative responsible 
                                              
5
 The stipulation suggests that the anchor was not mentioned in the 
report ultimately issued by the University of Delaware professors.  
See J.A. at 1310–12.  Instead, it seems that it was not until after this 
litigation began that the parties obtained the 2001 side scan sonar 
data and agreed that it revealed the anchor‘s presence.   
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parties, see id. at § 2704(a), an incentive exists for responsible 
parties to respond quickly and competently in order to limit the 
extent of their financial exposure.  See Unocal Corp. v. United 
States, 222 F.3d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 2000) (―‗The purpose of [the 
Oil Pollution Act] . . . was to encourage rapid private party 
responses.‘‖ (quoting In re Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 
822 (1st Cir. 1997))).  Responsible parties in compliance with the 
Act may file a claim with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 
controlled by the United States Government, for reimbursement of 
costs beyond the liability limit.  33 U.S.C. § 2708(a)(2).  
Specifically, Frescati was able to limit its liability for cleanup to 
$45,474,000, thus allowing it to recover cleanup costs exceeding 
that amount from the Fund.
6
  It was ultimately reimbursed for 
approximately $88,000,000 of its cleanup costs, and the Fund 
became subrogated as to that amount under 33 U.S.C. §§ 2712(f) 
and 2715(a).   
D.   Control of the Waters    
The casualty here occurred squarely within Anchorage 
Number Nine.  As the term implies, an anchorage ground is ―a 
place where vessels anchor or a place suitable for anchoring.‖  
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 79 (1971).  Section 7 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1915 authorizes the establishment of 
―anchorage grounds for vessels in all harbors, rivers, bays, and 
other navigable waters of the United States whenever it is 
manifest . . . that the maritime or commercial interests of the 
United States require such anchorage grounds for safe 
                                              
6
 In February 2007, Frescati applied to have its liability exonerated 
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3).  That subsection directs that a 
responsible party is not liable for the acts or omissions of a third 
party.  In this case, that third party would have been the unknown 
anchor-dropper.  It is unclear why Frescati withdrew this claim in 
2008.  
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navigation . . . .‖  33 U.S.C. § 471.  By 1930, a ―lack of adequate 
anchorage room‖ was creating a hazard on the Delaware River 
between navigating vessels and those ―awaiting accommodation at 
the wharves, or awaiting cargo or orders.‖  H. Doc. No. 71-304, 24 
(1930).  Anchorage Number Nine, also known as the Mantua Creek 
Anchorage, was established in 1930.  Pub. L. No. 71-520, 46 Stat. 
918, 921 (1930).  Today it runs for approximately 2.2 miles along 
the Delaware River channel (see Appendix A) and provides a place 
for ships to anchor so long as they do not ―interfere unreasonably 
with the passage of other vessels to and from Mantua Creek.‖  33 
C.F.R. § 110.157(a)(10).        
Anchorage Number Nine, though only a few hundred feet 
from CARCO‘s pier, is neither controlled nor maintained by 
CARCO.  Instead, the federal Government‘s Army Corps of 
Engineers (the ―Corps‖) conducts hydrographic surveys and 
dredges as necessary in an attempt to maintain the Anchorage‘s 
depth at 40 feet.  The Corps also regulates any construction or 
excavation within the navigable waters, including the issuance of 
dredging permits, 33 U.S.C. § 403, and its regulatory jurisdiction 
―extend[s] laterally to the entire water surface and bed of a 
navigable waterbody, which includes all the land and waters below 
the ordinary high water mark,‖ 33 C.F.R. § 329.11.  The National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration conducts surveys on 
occasion for various federal projects.  No Government entity, 
however, is responsible for preemptively searching all federal 
waters for obstructions, and the District Court found that the 
Government does not actually survey the Anchorage for hazards.  
If, however, the Government is alerted to the presence of a threat, 
the Corps will remove the obstruction if it is a hazard to navigation 
and, if not removable, the Coast Guard will chart it.  Ultimately, 
the ―[p]rimary responsibility for removal of wrecks or other 
obstructions lies with the [obstruction‘s] owner, lessee, or 
operator.‖  33 C.F.R. § 245.10(b).     
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 CARCO maintains a self-described ―area of responsibility‖ 
directly abutting its Paulsboro terminal, ―a roughly triangular-
shaped area . . . comprising the waters of the berth footprint and the 
immediate access area next to it where vessels enter and exit the 
footprint.‖  CARCO‘s Br. at 19.  This area, also set out in 
Appendix A to this opinion, runs essentially the length of 
CARCO‘s facility and extends offshore to the border of the 
Anchorage.  It is based on a permit to dredge for maintenance 
purposes that was issued by the Corps to CARCO‘s predecessor in 
1991.  The scope of such a permit is derived from the initial 
request; put another way, it is self-defined subject to approval by 
the Corps.  This area of responsibility is not large enough to rotate 
the 748 foot-long Athos I. 
In maintaining its area of responsibility, CARCO retained a 
consulting engineering firm, S.T. Hudson Engineers, Inc., to 
perform hydrographic surveys.  While CARCO had inspected that 
area for depth, it never specifically searched for debris or other 
hazards.  Hudson interpolated the area‘s depth from a grid of 
pinpointed, single-beam sonar depth soundings at 50-foot intervals.  
This particular procedure is poor at detecting sunken objects 
because it is unlikely that any given hazard would fall within the 
exact spot measured, and if it did, it would not necessarily indicate 
that there was an object but only the depth of that object as 
indistinguishable from the bottom of the waterway.  Long Test., 
78:8–79:5, Nov. 17, 2010; Fish Test., 59:11–18, Sept. 29, 2010.     
CARCO‘s Port Captain William Rankine estimated that 
approximately 250 ships with a draft of 36ʹ6ʺ or greater either 
entered or departed CARCO‘s port between 1997 and 2005.  
Rankine Test., 22:25–23:15, Nov. 22, 2010.  In specific regard to 
arriving vessels, from the time the anchor was spotted by the 
University of Delaware in August 2001 until the Athos I casualty, 
the record reflects that 61 ships with a draft of 36ʹ6ʺ or greater 
arrived at CARCO‘s facility.  J.A. at 1788–94.  The record does not 
reflect at what time these ships docked, and high tide adds 
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approximately six feet of depth to the River.  Moreover, Frescati 
points out that—unlike the Athos I—21 of these ships would have 
been required to dock within three hours prior to high-water due to 
their excessive drafts.
7
  Id. at 1622–24.    
 E.   The District Court Proceedings  
In January 2005, Frescati filed in the District Court a 
Complaint for Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability 
pursuant to the Shipowner‘s Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§ 30501 et seq. (formerly 46 App. U.S.C. § 181 et seq.).  In that 
Complaint, Frescati sought a declaration that it was not liable for 
any losses stemming from the accident or, in the alternative, a 
limitation of liability to the value of the Athos I and its pending 
freight.  CARCO was among the parties who asserted claims in that 
action, seeking recovery against Frescati for its lost oil in an 
amount in excess of $259,217.  Frescati then filed a counterclaim 
against CARCO for all costs incurred beyond those reimbursed by 
the Fund. 
In June 2008, the Government filed a separate suit against 
CARCO seeking compensation on its subrogated right, pursuant to 
33 U.S.C. §§ 2712(f) and 2715(a), to the approximately $88 
million disbursed by the Fund.  In a pretrial settlement agreement, 
the Government waived its negligence claims against CARCO in 
return for the latter‘s agreement not to pursue negligence claims 
against the United States.  The Government, believing that CARCO 
                                              
7
 The Docking Pilot Association (―DPA‖) Guidelines provide 
directives for the appropriate docking times for vessels of different 
sizes.  The DPA Guidelines were developed after discussion with 
CARCO‘s previous Port Captain and were based in part on 
CARCO‘s desire to maximize the number of vessels that could 
dock at its berth.  J.A. at 1104; Quillen Dep. 11:12–20, Sept. 2, 
2010.   
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was advancing against it negligence theories in violation of the 
settlement agreement, moved for partial summary judgment against 
CARCO‘s counterclaim for equitable recoupment.  That motion 
was denied. 
As noted, these two actions were consolidated, and they 
were tried over 41 days before Judge Fullam.  After trial, the Court 
issued an 18-page opinion holding that CARCO could not be held 
responsible under contract or tort for any of the losses stemming 
from the accident.  See In re Frescati, 2011 WL 1436878.   
On the contractual safe berth warranty, the Court determined 
that Frescati had no standing for relief, as it was not a third-party 
beneficiary to the voyage charter party between CARCO and Star 
Tankers, and that, in any event, CARCO did not breach those 
warranties because they are not unconditional guarantees but 
instead ―‗impose[] upon the charterer a duty of due diligence to 
select a safe berth,‘‖ a duty satisfied here.  Id. at *6 (quoting 
Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149, 1157 (5th 
Cir. 1990)).  The Court further ruled that, even if a stricter warranty 
applied, the naming of the port in advance precluded recovery 
under the named port exception, which, as a general matter, 
protects a charterer when the port is named ahead of arrival and the 
master proceeds there without protest.       
The Court also held that CARCO was not negligent in 
failing to search for or detect the abandoned anchor that lay within 
the Anchorage.  As the Court deemed it outside the approach to 
CARCO‘s berth, detection and notification to others of its presence 
thus fell beyond CARCO‘s obligation to provide a safe entry to that 
berth.  The Court also held that there was no negligent 
misrepresentation in CARCO‘s failure to alert the Athos I that—
only four days prior to its arrival—the allowable maximum draft at 
CARCO‘s facility had been reduced from 38 feet to 36 feet.  It 
reasoned that this was an internal determination pertaining to the 
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area at the berth and outside the Anchorage, and therefore was 
―factually irrelevant to the casualty.‖  Id. at *5.   
In sum, the District Court concluded that the anchor-dropper 
rather than any of the named parties was at fault, and rejected all of 
Frescati‘s and the Government‘s arguments as to CARCO‘s 
liability.   
II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
The District Court had admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1333(1).  We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.     
Findings of fact made during a bench trial are reviewed for 
clear error, and will stand unless ―‗completely devoid of minimum 
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or . . . bear 
no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.‘‖  In re 
Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 85 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 
F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Following a bench trial, we review de 
novo a district court‘s conclusions of law.  McCutcheon v. Am.’s 
Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  
―[C]onstruction of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law and 
subject to plenary review.‖  Colliers Lanard & Axilbund v. Lloyds 
of London, 458 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing U & W Indus. 
Supply, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 34 F.3d 180, 185 (3d 
Cir. 1994)).  Similarly, we exercise ―plenary review over the legal 
question of ‗the nature and extent of the duty of due care . . . .‘‖  
Andrews v. United States, 801 F.2d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 
1982)).   
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III.   Rule 52 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1) provides that ―[i]n 
an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of 
law separately.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).  This is a mandatory 
requirement.  H. Prang Trucking Co., Inc. v. Local Union No. 469, 
613 F.2d 1235, 1238 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 9 Charles Alan Wright 
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2574, at 690 
(1st ed. 1971)); Scalea v. Scalea’s Airport Serv., Inc., 833 F.2d 
500, 502 (3d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).  Typically, a Rule 52 
violation occurs when a district court‘s inadequate findings render 
impossible ―‗a clear understanding of the basis of the decision,‘‖ H. 
Prang Trucking, 613 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Wright & Miller, 
supra, § 2577, at 697), and those ―‗findings are obviously 
necessary to the intelligent and orderly presentation and proper 
disposition of an appeal,‘‖ Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 
F.2d 1172, 1178 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Mayo v. Lakeland 
Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 317 (1940)).  See also 
Berguido v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 369 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(―If a full understanding of the factual issues cannot be gleaned 
from the District Court‘s opinion, we would be obliged to remand 
for compliance with Rule 52(a).‖).  Although Rule 52 does not 
require hyper-literal adherence, see Hazeltine Corp. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 131 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1942), ―an appellate court may 
vacate the judgment and remand the case for findings if the trial 
court has failed to make findings when they are required,‖ Giles v. 
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing H. Prang 
Trucking, 613 F.2d at 1238–39).           
Instead of presenting his findings in accord with Rule 52, 
the trial judge here elected to ―set forth in narrative fashion [his] 
findings of fact . . . and conclusions of law.‖  In re Frescati, 2011 
WL 1436878, at *1.  Unfortunately, what followed leaves us 
unable to discern what were his intended factual findings.  
Moreover, in arriving at his particular legal conclusions, the trial 
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judge held back making many of the factual findings that would 
support those conclusions, in effect going from first base to third 
across the pitcher‘s mound.  While we do not endorse or require a 
panoply of extraneous factual findings, the overall dearth of clear 
factual findings, much less those pertaining to the heart of this 
matter—such as the draft of the Athos I—falls below what is 
required by Rule 52.   
Because we cannot derive a full understanding of the core 
facts from the District Court‘s opinion, this was a violation of Rule 
52 and itself a basis for remand.  Giles, 571 F.3d at 328.  In light of 
the legal determinations set out below, factual clarification is 
required in any event.    
IV.   The Contractual Safe Berth Warranty  
CARCO‘s promise to Star Tankers that the Athos I would be 
directed to a location that ―she may safely get (always afloat)‖ is a 
provision known in context as either a safe port or safe berth 
warranty (to repeat again, we use for shorthand ―safe berth 
warranty‖).  See Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 5.121 (citation omitted).  
This language triggers two separate protections:  a contractual 
excuse for a master who elects not to venture into an unsafe port, 
and protection against damages to a ship incurred in an unsafe port 
to which the warranty applies.  See 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 
Admiralty and Maritime Law § 11-10, at 32–33 (5th ed. 2011).  In 
this case, only the second benefit of the safe berth warranty is at 
issue, as the Athos I was damaged in an allegedly unsafe port.  
Specifically at issue are the scope and applicability of this 
warranty, topics we explore below.   
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A.   Was Frescati a Third-Party Beneficiary of the 
Safe Berth Warranty? 
 ―‗Before a stranger can avail himself of the exceptional 
privilege of suing for a breach of an agreement, to which he is not a 
party, he must at least show that it was intended for his direct 
benefit.‘‖  Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 
307 (1927) (quoting German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water 
Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 230 (1912)).  As Frescati is not a party 
to CARCO‘s promise to Star Tankers to provide a safe berth, there 
must be some showing that it was nonetheless an intended 
beneficiary.  The District Court held that this was not the case 
because the testimony at trial failed to reveal any intent by CARCO 
to benefit Frescati.  The Court, however, failed to inquire whether 
the contract itself established a third-party beneficiary relationship, 
a question of law.  See Pierce Assocs. v. Nemours Found., 865 F.2d 
530, 535 (3d Cir. 1988).  We conclude that, although Frescati is not 
a named beneficiary to the safe berth warranty within the charter 
party between Star Tankers and CARCO, the Athos I benefits from 
this warranty, and Frescati, as the vessel‘s owner, is thus a third-
party beneficiary.       
Maritime contracts ―must be construed like any other 
contracts:  by their terms and consistent with the intent of the 
parties.‖  Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31 (2004).  
―When a contract is a maritime one, and the dispute is not 
inherently local, federal law controls the contract interpretation.‖  
Id. at 22–23 (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 
(1961)).  We typically look to the Restatement of Contracts for the 
federal law on third-party beneficiaries.  Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. 
of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 106 (3d Cir. 2008); see 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981).  A third-party 
may be a beneficiary to a contract of others where it is ―appropriate 
to effect[] the intention of the parties,‖ and ―the circumstances 
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the 
benefit of the promised performance.‖  Restatement, supra, § 
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302(1)(b); see also Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 
F.2d 1012, 1019 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a third-party 
beneficiary to a charter party ―must show that ‗the parties to that 
contract intended to confer a benefit on [it] when contracting; it is 
not enough that some benefit incidental to the performance of the 
contract may accrue to [it]‘‖ (alterations in original) (quoting 
McPheeters v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 953 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 
1992))).   
In 1959, the Supreme Court held that vessels are automatic 
third-party beneficiaries of warranties of workmanlike service 
made to their charterers by stevedores who unload vessels at docks.  
Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 428 
(1959).  This is because ―[t]he warranty which a stevedore owes 
when he goes aboard a vessel to perform services is plainly for the 
benefit of the vessel whether the vessel‘s owners are parties to the 
contract or not.‖  Id.  This natural relationship between the entities 
was ―enough to bring the vessel into the zone of modern law that 
recognizes rights in third-party beneficiaries.‖  Id. (citation 
omitted).  A year later, the Supreme Court extended this rule a 
logical step further in holding that ―[t]he owner, no less than the 
ship, is the beneficiary of the stevedore‘s warranty of workmanlike 
service.‖  Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 
U.S. 421, 425 (1960).     
Although these two Supreme Court cases aid Frescati‘s 
position, they do so only by analogy.  As CARCO points out, the 
matter before us does not involve an implied warranty for 
workmanlike service, but an explicit assurance of safety in a 
document to which Frescati is not a party.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, however, has applied Crumady and 
Waterman to a set of facts similar to the one before us.  In Paragon 
Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A., 310 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1962) 
(Friendly, J.), a vessel owner (Paragon Oil Co., Inc.) and voyage 
charterer (Republic Tankers, S.A.) entered into a voyage charter 
with a safe berth warranty.  Republic had executed a contract of 
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affreightment (essentially a sub-voyage charter) with a third-party 
that contained a safe berth warranty identical to the one it promised 
in the voyage charter.  Id.  From this, the Second Circuit concluded 
that Paragon (the owner) was ―the true party in interest‖ to the safe 
berth assurance in the contract of affreightment even though it was 
not explicitly named in the contract between Republic (the voyage 
charterer) and the third-party.  Id. at 175.     
We agree that the Second Circuit‘s reasoning in Crumady 
and Waterman counsel in favor of Frescati‘s third-party beneficiary 
status.  Specifically, we are convinced that a safe berth warranty 
necessarily benefits the vessel, and thus benefits its owner as a 
corollary beneficiary.
8
  ―[T]he circumstances indicate‖ that the 
warranty is intended to endow the vessel with ―the benefit of the 
promised performance.‖  Restatement, supra, § 302(1)(b).  Because 
the warranty explicitly covers the safety of the vessel, it would be 
nonsensical to deprive the vessel‘s owner the benefits of this 
                                              
8
 Insofar as CARCO cites to Bunge Corp. v. MV Furness Bridge, 
390 F. Supp. 603, 604 (E.D. La. 1974), it is unpersuasive, as its 
conclusion that the owner was not a third-party beneficiary of the 
sub-charterer‘s safe berth warranty is unsupported by any 
reasoning.  Further, this issue was abandoned when the Court later 
resolved the merits of the claim and held that the sub-charterer had 
―violated a legal duty [in tort] whether or not it also had a 
contractual one.‖  Bunge Corp. v. MV Furness Bridge, 396 F. Supp. 
852, 858 (E.D. La. 1975), rev’d, 558 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1977).  On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that the 
issue of contractual liability was ―irrelevant‖ because none of the 
parties could have intended to warrant complete safety of an 
inadequately small wharf.  558 F.2d at 801–02.   
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promise, as the owner is ultimately the one most interested in the 
vessel‘s status and is obligated to maintain its condition.9   
Moreover, it would work an odd windfall if Star Tankers 
were allowed to collect on CARCO‘s safe berth warranty but not 
be required to pass on those remedial dollars to the ship‘s ultimate 
owner.  That illogical result could occur where the owner (Frescati) 
received no safe berth warranty from the time charterer (Star 
Tankers), or where—as in the case before us—Frescati received a 
less comprehensive warranty from Star Tankers than Star Tankers 
received from the voyage charterer (CARCO).
10
  This would 
theoretically allow Star Tankers to collect for damages to the ship 
that were actually paid by Frescati.  While we are mindful of the 
parties‘ ability to contract differently, there is no indication that 
Star Tankers bargained for the potential of such an unearned 
windfall—profiting from the mishaps of the vessels within its 
tanker pool when it did not pay for the repair of those mishaps.  
Instead, requiring warranties from voyage charterers like CARCO 
is a way to insure against claims asserted by vessel owners.  Per 
this path, the promise made to protect a vessel flows through the 
intermediary party(ies) to the ultimate party who bore the pain of 
an unsafe port, here the vessel‘s owner.    
We discount CARCO‘s suggestion that it was unaware of 
Frescati‘s status as the true owner of the Athos I.  CARCO had 
                                              
9
 Under the time charter, Frescati remained responsible for 
insuring, maintaining, and restoring the Athos I throughout the term 
of the charter.  J.A. at 1447–48 (Time Charter Party ¶¶ 3, 6). 
 
10
 Although we ultimately conclude that the full safe berth warranty 
from CARCO to Star Tankers is an express assurance made 
without regard to the amount of diligence taken by the charterer, 
see infra Part IV.B, Star Tankers only promised due diligence to 
Frescati, J.A. at 1448 (Time Charter Party ¶ 4).   
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completed an internal vetting of the Athos I in October of 2004 that 
identified Frescati as its owner.  J.A. at 1318 (Citgo Vetting 
Report).  Regardless, even if the ultimate owner had been 
undisclosed, CARCO expressly warranted to provide a safe berth, 
which is a promise made ―plainly for the benefit of the vessel.‖  
Crumady, 358 U.S. at 428.  Thus we see no reason why the Athos 
I‘s owner would be any less entitled to rely on this warranty, 
whether it was identified or not.  Frescati, as the owner of the Athos 
I, may therefore rely on CARCO‘s safe berth warranty as a third-
party beneficiary.   
B.   The Scope of the Safe Berth Warranty  
That Frescati may benefit from CARCO‘s safe port/safe 
berth warranty requires that we delineate its comprehensiveness, a 
question of first impression in our Circuit.  Though the District 
Court did not need to reach this legal issue after determining that 
Frescati was not a third-party beneficiary, it nonetheless 
concluded—as an alternate holding—that the safe berth warranty 
was not breached because ―CARCO fulfilled its duty of due 
diligence . . . .‖  In re Frescati, 2011 WL 1436878, at *6.  We part 
from this holding, as we believe the Court incorrectly relied on 
Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149, 1157 (5th 
Cir. 1990), which held that the safe berth provision was not a full 
warranty but required only due diligence.  
A port is deemed safe where ―the particular chartered vessel 
can proceed to it, use it, and depart from it without, in the absence 
of abnormal weather or other occurrences, being exposed to 
dangers which cannot be avoided by good navigation and 
seamanship.‖  Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 5.137; Leeds Shipping v. 
Societe Francaise Bunge (The Eastern City), [1958] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 
127, 131 (same).  Whether a port is safe refers to the particular ship 
at issue, Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 5.68, and goes beyond ―the 
immediate area of the port itself‖ to the ―adjacent areas the vessel 
must traverse to either enter or leave,‖ Coghlin et al., supra, 
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¶ 10.124.  In other words, a port is unsafe—and in violation of the 
safe berth warranty—where the named ship cannot reach it without 
harm (absent abnormal conditions or those not avoidable by 
adequate navigation and seamanship).
11
     
This formulation is deeply rooted.  In 1888, the Supreme 
Court held charterers liable for breach of a safe berth warranty in 
insisting that a ship sail to Aalborg, Denmark, a port that was 
impossible for the particular ship to reach due to a sand bar and the 
absence of any reasonably safe place to anchor or discharge.  The 
Gazelle, 128 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1888).  In a similar fashion, the 
Supreme Court held in 1902 that charterers failed to provide a safe 
dock where the ship in question could not reach it without damage.  
Mencke v. Cargo of Java Sugar, 187 U.S. 248, 253 (1902).  
Specifically, the charterers were aware that the ship‘s mast was too 
tall to clear the Brooklyn Bridge when they designated a discharge 
dock upriver from the Bridge.  Id. at 250.  The Court concluded 
that this was a warranty violation by analogizing the overhead 
obstacle to a submerged one:  ―A ship could not be said to be 
afloat, whether the obstacle encountered was a shoal or bar in the 
port over which she could not proceed, or a bridge under or through 
which she could not pass, nor could she be said to have safely 
reached a dock if required to mutilate her hull or her permanent 
masts.‖  Id. at 253; see also Carbon Slate Co. v. Ennis, 114 F. 260, 
261 (3d Cir. 1902) (concluding that safe berth warranty was 
violated where the ship ―was directed to load at a berth where a full 
cargo, if taken aboard, would have made it impossible for her, at 
any stage of water or at any time, to pass out over the harbor bar‖). 
                                              
11
 On the facts before us, we need not define the outer geographical 
bounds of the safe berth/safe port warranty.  At oral argument 
CARCO conceded that the warranty—if applicable—―would 
include the area in and around Paulsboro,‖ including the 
Anchorage.  Oral Arg. Tr. 62:18–64:3, Sept. 20, 2012.   
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has long held 
that promising a safe berth effects an ―express assurance‖ that the 
berth will be as represented.  Cities Serv. Transp. Co. v. Gulf Ref. 
Co., 79 F.2d 521, 521 (2d Cir. 1935) (per curiam), recognized this 
principle in holding that a master was not liable for damages 
incurred in reliance on a charter party‘s safe berth warranty at a 
particular dock.   In Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188 F.2d 
804, 806 (2d Cir. 1951) (Swan, J.), the same Court elaborated that 
the purpose of the warranty was to memorialize the relationship 
between the contracting entities:  ―the charterer bargains for the 
privilege of selecting the precise place for discharge and the ship 
surrenders that privilege in return for the charterer‘s acceptance of 
the risk of its choice.‖  Paragon continued this tradition in 
contrasting the duty of a wharfinger (an admiralty term for an 
―owner or occupier of a wharf,‖ Black’s Law Dictionary 1733 (9th 
ed. 2009))—to exercise reasonable diligence in keeping its berth 
safe for incoming vessels—with that of a charterer who is 
contractually bound to provide ―not only a place which he believes 
to be safe, but a place where the chartered vessel can discharge 
‗always afloat.‘‖  310 F.2d at 173 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  See also Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego Shipping 
Corp. 498 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Park S.S. Co., 188 
F.2d at 804) (sub-charterer had a non-delegable ―obligation to 
provide a completely safe berth,‖ which was breached when it 
permitted the ship to dock at a berth that it knew was unsafe).            
Thus, prior to the Fifth Circuit‘s decision in Orduna, ―the 
law concerning safe ports had a rather secure berth in maritime law 
and it was well settled that a safe port clause in a charter 
constituted a warranty given by a charterer to an owner.‖  Cooke et 
al., supra, ¶ 5.124.  Orduna created quite a splash in veering from 
the view that a charterer warrants a ship‘s safety, and established 
instead for the Fifth Circuit that a safe berth warranty merely 
―imposes upon the charterer a duty of due diligence to select a safe 
berth.‖  913 F.2d at 1157.  While Orduna acknowledged the 
Second Circuit‘s contrary perspective, it dismissed that 
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interpretation in deference to critical commentators, namely 
Professors Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black.  Id. at 1156 (citing 
Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 4-4, at 
204–06 (2d ed. 1975)).  We do not find their criticism so 
compelling.
12
   
Orduna concluded that ―no legitimate legal or social policy 
is furthered by making the charterer warrant the safety of the berth 
it selects.‖  Id. at 1157.  Primarily, the Court reasoned that it is 
more sensible to impose fault on the ―master on the scene‖ rather 
than a far away merchant charterer.
13
  Id. at 1156 (citing Gilmore & 
                                              
12
 Gilmore‘s book has been described as being  
more adapted for the teacher than for the active 
lawyer or judge.  As teachers, the authors are 
interested in controversy.  Wherever they can find it, 
in the long past or in the nearer present, they stir it 
up, and frequently label it ‗confusion.‘ . . . It is all 
very interesting; but in the various admiralty fields— 
except personal injury and death—most of the old 
controversies have long been settled.  Therefore, our 
authors tend to give a picture which does not 
resemble the daily grist of today.  Sometimes indeed, 
straining to keep old battle-fires ablaze, they sprinkle 
harsh words on the judges who settled the old 
disputes. . . . On the whole, this is a teaching book 
rather than an office and courtroom work of 
reference; and it must be read as such.   
Arnold W. Knauth, Book Review, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 425, 426–28 
(1958) (reviewing Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law 
of Admiralty (1957)).   
 
13
Orduna also noted that a due diligence standard would not upset a 
master‘s ability to rely on a safe berth warranty in rejecting an 
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Black, supra, § 4-4, at 204–06).  The appeal of this construction 
here is illusory.  While an owner is liable for its master‘s 
superseding negligence, see Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 5.151, we see no 
policy reason why a master on board a ship would normally be in 
any better position to appraise a port‘s more subtle dangers than the 
party who actually selected that port.  The ―commercial reality [is] 
that it is the charterer rather than the owner who is selecting the 
port or berth,‖ id. ¶ 5.126, and the charterer is more likely to have 
at least some familiarity with the port it selected.  After all, 
charterers do not select ports without good reason (and, in the case 
before us, CARCO was directly on the scene, as it had selected its 
own berth).  Messrs. Gilmore and Black (famous in other areas of 
law—Gilmore on commercial law, including secured transactions, 
and Black on constitutional law) acknowledged that their rationale 
is undermined in those instances where a charterer has more 
knowledge of a danger than the master (although they explain that 
these situations could be remedied through tort liability
14
).  We 
                                                                                                              
unsafe port.  913 F.3d at 1156.  This goes only so far, as it 
addresses but half of the safe berth warranty‘s protection, which is 
both to provide a master with a contractual excuse for avoiding an 
unsafe port and to protect for damages actually sustained in unsafe 
ports.  Additionally, to the extent Orduna relied on Atkins v. Fibre 
Disintegrating Co., 2 F. Cas. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868), aff’d sub nom. 
Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. 272, 299 (1873), we are 
similarly unpersuaded.  While Atkins featured a safe berth 
warranty, id. at 79, it was essentially an application of the named 
port exception.  See infra Part IV.D.  As the ship‘s master made 
outside inquiries and was fully aware of the port‘s dangers and yet 
did not object, he waived his right to complain later for damage.  
Id. at 79–80.   
 
14
 Specifically, Gilmore & Black would find an actionable wrong 
for charterers directing ships to ports with known dangers, and 
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disagree.  To any extent a charterer, however distant, bargains to 
send a ship to a particular port and warrants that it shall be safe 
there, we see no basis to upset this contractual arrangement.   
We are persuaded that the Second Circuit‘s longstanding 
formulation of the safe berth clause is the one we should follow.
15
  
See 2 Schoenbaum, supra, § 11-10, at 32–33 (citing The Gazelle, 
128 U.S. 474 (1888)) (―[I]f the ship reasonably complies with the 
order and proceeds to port, the charterer is liable for any damage 
sustained.‖); Stewart C. Boyd et al., Scrutton on Charter Parties 
and Bills of Lading, Section IX, art. 69, at 127 (20th ed. 1996) 
(same); 2A Michael F. Sturley, Benedict on Admiralty § 175, at 
17–25 (7th ed. 2012) (same); Coghlin et al., supra, ¶ 10.110 
(same).  But see Gilmore & Black, supra, § 4-4, at 204–06.   
Beyond the near consensus of these authorities, we are also 
convinced that an ―express assurance‖ warranty is most consistent 
with industry custom.  See Park S.S., 188 F.2d at 806; Cities Serv., 
79 F.2d at 521.  Vessel charters are formalized via ―highly 
standardized forms,‖ 2 Schoenbaum, supra, § 11-1, at 4–5 (citation 
omitted).  That some forms explicitly adopt a due diligence 
                                                                                                              
suggest that a charterer may sometimes be ―so situated as 
reasonably to be charged with a duty of inquiry, particularly as to 
berth.‖  Gilmore & Black, supra, § 4-4, at 205.   
 
15
 Though not dispositive, we also note that adhering to the Second 
Circuit‘s view on this issue promotes uniformity of maritime law 
along the mid-Atlantic seaboard.  See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 552 F.2d 985, 995–96 n.18a 
(3d Cir. 1977) (noting deference pursuant to federal comity and 
uniformity in maritime law to the Second Circuit, ―since [the Third 
Circuit] shares appellate review with the Second Circuit over the 
geographical area comprising one of the country‘s major east coast 
harbor complexes‖). 
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standard
16
 suggests that the understood default is to impose liability 
on the charterer without regard to the care taken.  See Coghlin et 
al., supra, ¶¶ 10.52, 10.54.  Reading these warranties as dappled 
with due diligence would make contractual language explicitly 
adopting a due diligence metric pointless, and we disfavor contract 
interpretation ―that ‗render[s] at least one clause superfluous or 
meaningless.‘‖  Sloan & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 653 F.3d 175, 
181 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Garza v. Marine 
Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1988)).  Moreover, the 
―always afloat‖ language plainly suggests an express assurance.  
To the extent the Fifth Circuit in Orduna deviated from this well-
established standard, we are not persuaded by its reasoning and 
decline to follow the course it charted.
17
  Hence we conclude that 
the safe berth warranty is an express assurance made without 
regard to the amount of diligence taken by the charterer.   
C.   Was the Safe Berth Warranty Breached? 
As explained, a berth is deemed safe when a ship may 
―proceed to it, use it, and depart from it without . . . being exposed 
to dangers.‖   Coghlin et al., supra, ¶ 10.123.  As noted above, see 
supra note 11, CARCO conceded at oral argument that the safe 
berth warranty—if applicable—―would include the area in and 
around Paulsboro,‖ including the Anchorage, and we therefore 
need not delineate the geographic sweep of this warranty.  Thus 
having determined that Frescati was a beneficiary of CARCO‘s 
                                              
16
 As already mentioned, the time charter party between Star 
Tankers and Frescati contains such a standard, as it is predicated on 
a Shelltime 4 form.  See Coghlin et al., supra, ¶ 10.54.   
 
17
 We are also unpersuaded that this warranty applies only to 
known hazards.  This would effectively undermine the more strict 
nature of the warranty by requiring some level of due diligence, 
which, for the reasons above, we do not believe is the case.      
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safe berth warranty and that this warranty applies irrespective of a 
charterer‘s diligence, we proceed to whether the warranty was 
actually breached by the anchor‘s presence.  Specifically, we need 
to determine whether the anchor rendered CARCO‘s port unsafe 
for a ship of the Athos I‘s agreed-upon dimensions and draft.    
That the Athos I was injured by the anchor does not 
automatically indicate that the warranty was breached.  CARCO‘s 
safe berth warranty was not a blank check; it did not warrant that 
any ship would be safe at its port, but instead assured that the port 
would be safe for the Athos I.  Boyd et al., supra, Section IX, art. 
69, at 129–30 (citations omitted) (―Whether a port is a ‗safe port‘ is 
in each case a question of fact and degree and must be determined 
with reference to the particular ship concerned . . . .‖); In re Lloyd’s 
Leasing Ltd., 764 F. Supp. 1114, 1135 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (―The 
safety of a port is to be determined with reference to the vessel and 
the circumstances surrounding that vessel‘s use of the port.‖).  In 
this regard, the District Court correctly framed the ultimate issue as 
whether it was possible for a ship of the Athos I‘s purported 
dimensions to reach CARCO‘s berth safely.  In re Frescati, 2011 
WL 1436878, at *6.   
The Court, however, neglected to make the necessary 
factual findings to resolve whether the warranty was actually 
breached.  Instead, it concluded ―that the port and berth were 
generally safe‖ due to ―the volume of commercial traffic that 
passed without incident,‖ notwithstanding that it was impossible to 
know how many of those ships had actually passed over the 
anchor.  Id.  That similar ships had successfully berthed at the port 
is irrelevant to whether the warranty was actually breached in this 
case, as ―[a] dangerous place may often be stopped at or passed 
over in safety.‖  The Gazelle, 128 U.S. at 485.  Instead, the Court 
should have evaluated whether the port was safe based on the facts 
particular to the Athos I and its arrival. 
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From what we can glean from the record, it appears that 
CARCO warranted a safe berth with the understanding that the 
Athos I would be drafting as much as 37 feet of water upon its 
arrival.  The Voyage Instructions indicate that the vessel would be 
filled with a quantity of crude oil ―always . . . consistent with a 37 
[foot] or less [fresh water] sailing draft at loadport,‖ J.A. at 1242, 
and Captain Markoutsis confirmed this directive, Markoutsis Test. 
199:5–9, Oct. 13, 2010.  He testified, moreover, that he was ―afraid 
of that draft,‖ and opted to load the ship to only 36ʹ6ʺ.18  Id. at 
200:7–25.  This latter figure was confirmed by CARCO Port 
Captain William Rankine, who testified that the Athos I reported 
that it was drafting 36ʹ6ʺ, Rankine Test. 41:5–12, Nov. 22, 2010, 
and also by Steamship Agent Stephen Carroll, Carroll Test. 63:2–4, 
Oct. 7, 2010.  In any event, the warranty made by CARCO appears 
to have covered the Athos I up to a draft of 37 feet.
19
  Yet, as noted 
throughout this opinion, the District Court made no finding on the 
                                              
18
 We note there is minor disagreement as to this particular figure.  
While the record suggests that the Athos I was represented as 
drafting 36ʹ6ʺ, Frescati explains that it was actually 36ʹ7ʺ.  This 
one-inch difference is on its face irrelevant to our analysis, as both 
drafts are less than 37 feet.   
 
19
 Of course, this is ultimately a factual matter for remand.  As 
such, we also note that the Voyage Charter between CARCO and 
Star Tankers indicates that the ―[l]oaded draft of Vessel on 
assigned summer freeboard [is] 12.423 meters [40.76 feet] . . . in 
salt water.‖  J.A. at 1220 (Tanker Voyage Charter Party, Part I.A).  
While we understand this to mean that the Athos I could draft over 
40 feet in salt water if filled to its summer capacity, the facts before 
us appear to indicate that it was directed to arrive at CARCO‘s port 
drafting 37 feet or less, and that this was the understood basis for 
the safe berth warranty.      
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vessel‘s actual draft at the time of the accident.  This needs to be 
corrected on remand.
20
        
If it is found that the Athos I was drafting 37 feet or less and 
absent a determination of bad navigation or seamanship,
21
 that 
finding would indicate that the warranty had been breached 
because the ship sustained damage.  What, if anything, under the 
water may have caused that margin to be diminished is therefore 
                                              
20
 We note that there is record evidence suggesting that the 
promised 37 feet of clearance was indeed afforded, namely that Dr. 
Traykovski opined that there was—in his most conservative 
estimate—between 37.2 and 37.8 feet of water not only above the 
riverbed but the anchor itself (presumably at low tide).  Traykovski 
Test. 49:12–50:24, Nov. 4, 2010.   
 
21
 Although the warranty exception for abnormal weather 
conditions is not at issue here, CARCO argues that the exceptions 
for bad navigation and seamanship apply.  CARCO‘s Br. at 77, 80; 
see also Coghlin et al., supra, ¶¶ 10.148, 10.166 (citations 
omitted); Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 5.151 (citation omitted); Paragon, 
310 F.2d at 173–74 (quoting Constantine & Pickering S.S. Co. v. 
W. India S.S. Co., 199 F. 964, 967–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)) (―It is true 
that one liable for violating a safe berth clause ‗may lessen the 
amount of damages for which he is responsible by showing 
negligence, or even lack of diligence, on the part of the person 
wronged, in failing to take steps to lessen certain or even probable 
damages.‘‖).     
CARCO argues that the vessel‘s master and the navigation 
officer believed they were docking at high tide, and in fact were not 
(as the tide at the time of the accident was rising but an hour 
removed from low tide).  However, we find no indication in the 
record that the Athos I was attempting to dock at an inappropriate 
time.   
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immaterial.  It could have been the remnants of a shipwreck, a 
range of rocks, a jutting reef, or a shoal.  In this case, it happened to 
be an abandoned anchor that protruded into the Athos I‘s hull.  And 
by its safe berth warranty, CARCO assumes liability for that 
damage.     
If the draft at the time of the accident cannot be determined, 
or if the Athos I is found to have been drafting more than 37 feet, it 
will be necessary to ascertain the amount of clearance that existed 
above the anchor to conclude whether the promised 37 feet of 
water depth was actually provided.
22
  Because it appears that 
Frescati assured a safe berth for a ship drafting 37 feet or less, our 
concern is whether 37 feet of clearance existed at the time of the 
accident.   
D.   The Named Port Exception  
CARCO exposes one additional limitation to the broad 
protection generally afforded by the safe berth warranty—the 
named port exception.  In essence, ―[w]hen a charter names a port 
                                              
22
 If the vessel is found to have been drafting more than 37 feet, 
this could potentially reduce CARCO‘s liability even if it were 
determined that a safe berth was not provided.  In this 
circumstance, the commentators note a trend in which damages 
resulting from both a breach of a safe berth warranty and the 
master‘s negligence may appropriately be split between the parties.  
Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 5.152; 2A Sturley, supra, § 175, at 17-26; see 
also Ore Carriers of Liber., Inc. v. Navigen Co., 435 F.2d 549, 
550–51 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming an order dividing a ship‘s 
damages between the owner and charterer where the charterer had 
warranted a safe port, but the owner nonetheless proceeded ―with 
full knowledge of the probable unavailability of tug assistance,‖ 
which was hazardous).  In any event, these issues can also be 
resolved on remand.     
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and the master proceeds there without protest, the owner accepts 
the port as a safe port, and is bound to the conditions that exist 
there.‖  Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790, 802 
(5th Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pan 
Cargo Shipping Corp. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 623, 638 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff’d, 373 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1967)).  The purpose 
of the exception is to shift liability to the owner once a ship‘s 
master has had ample opportunity to discover a port‘s hazards.23  
As such, the exception may apply in instances in which a master—
without lodging any objection—is charged ―with full knowledge of 
local conditions which make it unsafe for that particular voyage.‖  
Coghlin et al., supra, ¶ 10.158; see also Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 
5.130 (―[T]he master‘s conduct in entering a port he considers 
unsafe without raising a protest may result in a waiver of the safe 
port warranty.‖).   
This formulation is essentially an application of the above-
mentioned rule that negligent seamanship will nullify the safe port 
warranty:  once a particular risk becomes known, it is then the 
master‘s responsibility to avoid it through competent seamanship 
                                              
23
 Although it never uses the term ―named port exception,‖ Atkins 
v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F. Cas. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868), aff’d 
sub nom. Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. 272, 299 
(1873), is a paradigm for the exception.  There, ―the peril of the 
port was such that no vessel of [the ship‘s] size could get out 
without making her safety from the reefs dependent entirely upon 
the continuance of the breeze.‖  Id. at 79.  Predictably, the breeze 
failed, and the ship was damaged on the reef.  Id. at 78.  The trial 
court concluded, however, that the master could not rely on the 
agent‘s representation that the port was safe because he failed to 
object to the port after having ―made inquiries . . . as to the 
character of the port, which was, moreover, fully described in the 
Coast Pilot [the official publication describing the coast].‖  Id. at 
79–80.   
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or to declare the port unsafe.  This application of the exception 
does not apply to the case before us, however, as there is no 
suggestion that anyone—much less the master of the Athos I—had 
any inkling as to the anchor‘s existence in the River.   
Instead, and more pertinent to the Athos I, the exception is 
also triggered when a particular port is named in the charter party.  
See Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 5.130 (―If the charter names the ports or 
berths the vessel will call at, the general rule is that the ports or 
berths will have been accepted by the owner as safe, such that the 
safe port/safe berth warranty is deemed to have been waived.‖); 
Coghlin et al., supra, ¶ 10.164 (same) (citations omitted).  This 
particular application of the exception is very broad and would 
seem poised to swallow the rule, but frequently the voyage charter 
will specify a range of ports, and thus the ―safe [berth] warranty 
continues to play a role in voyage charters.‖  Cooke et al., supra, ¶ 
5.123.  In fact, this is such a case; the voyage charterer (CARCO) 
did not specifically name the discharge port in the voyage charter 
party, but instead directed that the Athos I would transit to one or 
two safe ports located somewhere on the United States Atlantic 
Coast, Gulf Coast, or the Caribbean Sea.  J.A. at 1225 (Tanker 
Voyage Charter Party, Special Provision 2).  CARCO nonetheless 
maintains that this exception applies even where the port location is 
not specifically named in the charter so long as some advance 
notice of the designated port is given.  It is unclear how much 
notice would be required under CARCO‘s theory of the exception, 
although CARCO argues that it applies here because there is 
evidence that the master knew approximately two weeks before the 
accident that the Athos I would be headed to Paulsboro, New 
Jersey.   
We need not address this issue of advance notice because 
we conclude that the hazard of the submerged anchor was not the 
sort contemplated by the exception.  As explained above, the 
purpose of the named port exception is to ―relieve[] the charterer of 
liability for damage arising from conditions at that port so long as 
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those conditions were reasonably foreseeable.‖  Duferco Int’l Steel 
Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 387 (2d Cir. 
2003) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Without at least an 
opportunity to discover a particular port‘s specific pitfalls, the 
identity of the port would be irrelevant.  This would defeat the 
purpose of naming the port, which is to excuse charterers for the 
results of hazardous conditions known to the master, not to 
exonerate them completely from all resulting liability.     
In sum, here the particular hazard—the submerged anchor—
was unknown to the parties.  As the naming of CARCO‘s port 
ahead of time did not provide the Athos I with an opportunity to 
accept this unknown hazard, the exception does not come into 
play.
24
   
V.   The Tort Claims  
Should its claim regarding CARCO‘s contractual liability 
not succeed, Frescati argues in the alternative that CARCO is liable 
as the owner of the terminal receiving the Athos I under two tort 
theories:  negligence and negligent misrepresentation.  The District 
Court held both theories inapplicable.  Although we agree that the 
negligent misrepresentation claim fails on these facts, we disagree 
                                              
24
 The District Court determined that although underwater hazards 
are a well-known threat, none of the parties had any reason to 
believe that Anchorage Number Nine was likely to conceal such a 
menace.  In re Frescati, 2011 WL 1436878, at *2.  To the extent 
the Court later determined that knowledge ―in general of lost or 
abandoned objects in the river‖ was sufficient to trigger this 
exception, id. at *7, that amounted to an error of law.  This sort of 
general knowledge cannot be used to impute knowledge of a 
specific condition, and we see no evidence that the Delaware River 
was known to be particularly treacherous in this regard.   
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with the Court‘s conclusion that Frescati‘s negligence claim is 
necessarily precluded.   
 A.   Negligence  
 Negligence in admiralty law is essentially coextensive with 
its common law counterpart, requiring: (1) ―[t]he existence of a 
duty required by law which obliges the person to conform to a 
certain standard of conduct‖; (2) ―[a] breach of that duty by 
engaging in conduct that falls below the applicable standard or 
norm‖; (3) a resulting loss or injury to the plaintiff; and (4) ―[a] 
reasonably close causal connection between the offending conduct 
and the resulting injury.‖  1 Schoenbaum, supra, §§ 5-2, at 252; 
Pearce v. United States, 261 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted) (same).   
Because this accident resulted in a clear loss, we address the 
existence of a duty, the potential breach of that duty, and causation.  
As discussed above, the wharfinger in this case—CARCO—
contracted to provide the Athos I a safe berth.  In the tort context, 
however, a wharfinger is not a guarantor of a visiting ship‘s safety, 
but is ―‗bound to use reasonable diligence in ascertaining whether 
the berths themselves and the approaches to them are in an ordinary 
condition of safety for vessels coming to and lying at the wharf.‘‖  
Smith v. Burnett, 173 U.S. 430, 436 (1899) (quoting, with approval, 
The Calliope, [1891] A.C. 11 (H.L.) 23 (appeal taken from Eng.)).  
This is not an unconstrained mandate to ―ensure safe surroundings 
or warn of hazards merely in the vicinity.‖  In re Nautilus, 85 F.3d 
at 116 (citing Trade Banner Line, Inc. v. Caribbean S.S. Co., S.A., 
521 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1975)).  Instead, a visiting ship may 
only expect that the owner of a wharf has afforded it a safe 
approach.  Id. (citations omitted).  In being invited to dock at a 
particular port, ―a vessel should be able to enter, use and exit a 
wharfinger‘s dock facilities without being exposed to dangers that 
cannot be avoided by reasonably prudent navigation and 
seamanship.‖  Id.  
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While CARCO has a duty to maintain a safe approach to its 
terminal, we must determine the geographic scope of that duty.   
 i. The Scope of the Approach  
 The geographic scope of a safe approach has been largely 
unaddressed by the courts.  Frescati argues that the scope should be 
inferred as a matter of custom and practice, and CARCO counters 
that the approach should be a function of the wharfinger‘s exertion 
of control.  The District Court, in attempting to adopt a workable 
method of analysis, was chiefly concerned about CARCO‘s lack of 
control in the Anchorage and the absence of a limiting principle if 
it were to define the approach as the waters that a ship ―naturally 
would traverse.‖  In re Frescati, 2011 WL 1436878, at *4.  
Accordingly, it opted to limit the approach to ―the area 
‗immediately adjacent‘ to the berth or within ‗immediate access‘ to 
the berth.‖  Id. (quoting Western Bulk Carriers v. United States, 
No. S-97-2423, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22371, at *20–21 (E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 14, 1999)).  Such immediacy, we believe, sets too 
constricted a path to the berth.  Instead, we hold that an approach 
should be understood by its ordinary terms, and that its scope is 
derived from custom and practice at the particular port in question.     
 Bouchard Transportation Co. v. Tug Gillen Brothers, 389 F. 
Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), is helpful in defining the geographic 
scope of an approach.  It partially concerned a claim by a barge 
owner against the terminal owner for negligence in failing to 
maintain a safe approach and to warn of an unsafe condition.  Id. at 
79.  The District Court there found that the approach began when 
the barge—traveling mid-channel up the Hudson River—altered its 
heading such that it was on a straight course to the terminal, which 
was the normal practice for ships docking there.  Id. at 80.  While 
executing this procedure, the barge grounded, its hull was 
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punctured, and oil was lost.
25
  Id. at 80–81.  Bouchard concluded 
that the terminal owner ―was negligent in failing to maintain the 
approach to its terminal, in particular that area outside the river 
channel and within its dominion and control, normally utilized as 
the southerly approach to its ship dock, free of obstruction and safe 
for vessels approaching said terminal.‖26  Id. at 81.   
Less instructive, but still worth exploring, is P. Dougherty 
Co. v. Bader Coal Co., 244 F. 267 (D. Mass. 1917).  There, an 
invitation to use a particular dock in a charter party was construed 
to ―extend[] to the approaches to the dock, and to the water which 
would naturally be traversed or used by a vessel discharging there.‖  
Id. at 270 (citing Hartford & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 125 F. 
                                              
25
 The grounding in Bouchard occurred ―immediately adjacent to 
the ballast dock,‖ approximately 50 feet away.  389 F. Supp. at 81.  
This ―immediately adjacent‖ language, however, does not refer to 
the beginning of the approach, but the location of the hazard within 
the approach.  The District Court in our case adopted this 
language—citing Western Bulk Carriers, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22371, at *20—as a ―reasonable definition of ‗approach.‘‖  In re 
Frescati, 2011 WL 1436878, at *4.  We believe this interpreted 
Bouchard incorrectly.   
 
26
 CARCO argues that this reference to ―dominion and control‖ is a 
prerequisite to Bouchard‘s holding.  We do not view control as a 
requirement, but as a fact of that case where the port was also 
deemed negligent for failing to warn of shallow waters in an area 
directly off its dock where it had previously dredged.  389 F. Supp. 
at 80, 83.  Instead, in relying primarily on Smith v. Burnett, 
Bouchard held that the terminal owner simply ―had a duty to 
ascertain any imminent dangers to [the ship] as it approached.‖  Id. 
at 83.  Further, to any extent Bouchard does suggest that control is 
required, we disagree for the reasons explained below.  
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981 (S.D.N.Y. 1903)).  Although P. Dougherty is of limited 
usefulness on its facts (the Court was interpreting the parties‘ 
express agreement to use the dock), its conclusion that the 
wharfinger‘s obligation covered ―individual approaches,‖ 
distinguished from ―the common channel,‖ is nonetheless helpful.  
Id.  More recently, MS Tabea Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co. 
KG v. Bd. of Com’rs of the Port of New Orleans, No. 08-3909, 
2010 WL 3923168, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2010), aff’d, 434 F. 
App‘x 337 (5th Cir. 2011), similarly defined the approach as ―the 
area through which vessels travel in order to move from the main 
channel of the river to the berth.‖  See also McCaldin v. Parke, 37 
N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1894) (determining that a cluster of rocks ―not 
in any channel which had to be used to approach the wharf,‖ but 
potentially ―in that part of the river used for general navigation,‖ 
was not within the approach).   
In light of these cases, we are persuaded by the suggestion 
in the maritime industry associations‘ amici brief that an approach 
should be afforded its plain meaning.  See Mar. Indus. Ass‘ns 
Amici Br. at 20.  As a noun, ―approach‖ is defined as ―a drawing 
near in space or time,‖ and ―a way, passage, or avenue by which a 
place or a building can be approached.‖  Webster’s Third New Int’l 
Dictionary 106 (1971).  This suggestion is persuasively illustrated 
by amici’s reference to an airplane on final approach or a golf ball 
approaching the green.  Both examples capture the intuitive 
meaning of the term as the beginning of a final, linear path to a 
fixed point.  In fact, Webster’s specifically incorporates those 
examples into its definition, listing ―a golfing stroke from the 
fairway for the green,‖ ―the steps and motion of a bowler before he 
delivers the ball,‖ and the ―descent of an airplane toward a landing 
strip.‖  Id.   
 What is an approach should be given its same plain meaning 
in the maritime context; when a ship transitions from its general 
voyage to a final, direct path to its destination, it is on an approach.  
This is the most logical construction, and it comports with those 
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cases suggesting that an approach should be gleaned from actual 
practice.  See, e.g., Bouchard, 389 F. Supp. at 80–81 (concluding 
that the approach began where vessels departed the channel on a 
direct course to the receiving dock and defined it pursuant to the 
area ―normally utilized‖).  It also reflects the definition used in the 
maritime industry.  For example, The Mariner’s Handbook defines 
―approaches‖ as ―[t]he waterways that give access or passage to 
harbours, channels, and similar areas.‖  J.A. Petty, The Mariner’s 
Handbook  226 (8th ed. 2004).  Further, in most cases it will not 
result in a line-drawing problem, a concern raised by CARCO and 
shared by the District Court.  Entire rivers, bays, and oceans will 
not be transformed into approaches.  Instead, in most instances the 
approach will begin where the ship makes its last significant turn 
from the channel toward its appointed destination following the 
usual path of ships docking at that terminal.  This analysis will 
necessarily vary on the characteristics of a particular port, and there 
will be close and difficult cases.  Accordingly, we believe it may be 
useful to analogize the final approach of a vessel to a port to that of 
a driveway leading to a home from the public road.
27
  It is the last 
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 In Smith v. Burnett, the United States Supreme Court quoted a 
Massachusetts Supreme Court case making a similar comparison 
where a defendant failed to warn a schooner of a rock it knew of 
adjacent to its wharf.  
This case cannot be distinguished in principle from 
that of the owner of land adjoining a highway, who, 
knowing that there was a large rock or a deep pit 
between the traveled part of the highway and his own 
gate, should tell a carrier, bringing goods to his house 
at night, to drive in, without warning him of the 
defect, and who would be equally liable for an injury 
sustained in acting upon his invitation, whether he 
did or did not own the soil under the highway.   
46 
 
segment of the voyage leading directly to the host‘s door.  Marine 
navigation is further complicated in that ships sometimes have the 
luxury of approaching through a variety of different courses across 
open water.  Yet, so long as a ship is not approaching in an 
illogical, unreasonable, or disallowed manner, it will be deemed 
within its approach when it is within this final phase of its journey.  
ii.  Was the Athos I Within the Approach to 
CARCO’s Terminal When the Accident 
Occurred?    
         Fortunately, the case before us is not one of the difficult ones, 
for the facts indicate that the Athos I was within the approach when 
it struck the anchor.  First, the vessel was following the usual path 
for ships of its size docking at CARCO‘s terminal, having turned 
away from the channel at the usual point and was being pushed by 
two tugboats in a straight path toward CARCO‘s pier.  Moreover, 
there were other indicators that the Athos I had ceased navigating 
generally and was within the final phase of its travel, namely that it 
was rotated sideways and, as noted, assisted by tugs.  While not 
dispositive factors, these trappings indicate that the Athos I was no 
longer voyaging, but was configured solely for docking.   
To the extent CARCO argues that the sphere of control 
exercised by it should be used to limit the scope of its duty,
28
 we 
                                                                                                              
173 U.S. at 434 (quoting Carleton v. Franconia Iron & Steel Co., 
99 Mass. 216, 219 (1868) (internal quotation marks omitted)).    
    
28
 In further support of this position, CARCO cites to Sonat Marine 
Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 629 F. Supp. 1319 (D.N.J. 1985), aff’d, 787 
F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1986) (table).  That case, however, does not 
apply on its facts, and uses a wharfinger‘s assumption of control to 
expand, rather than limit, the scope of its liability.  Specifically, 
that wharfinger took the initiative secretly to widen its approach 
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hold that a failure to exercise control over an area is not conclusive 
in this analysis.  The appeal of The Moorcock long-ago dispatched 
this argument.
29
  [1889] 14 P.D. 64 (Eng.).  The steamship 
Moorcock was invited to be discharged and loaded at a particular 
wharf where it would be moored alongside the wharfingers‘ jetty.  
Id. at 64.  Although the ship was expected to rest on the bottom of 
the River Thames at low tide, the particular section of riverbed was 
not actually under the wharfingers‘ control.  Id. at 69.  Even so, the 
Court explained that it ―d[id] not follow that [the wharfingers] are 
relieved from all responsibility.  They are on the spot.‖  Id. at 70.  It 
continued: 
No one can tell whether reasonable safety has been 
secured except themselves, and I think if they let out 
their jetty for use they at all events imply that they 
have taken reasonable care to see whether the berth, 
which is the essential part of the use of the jetty, is 
safe, and if it is not safe, and if they have not taken 
such reasonable care, it is their duty to warn persons 
                                                                                                              
because ―it recognized that larger vessels had problems entering the 
barge berth and required a greater margin of safety.‖  Id. at 1322.  
Insofar as the terminal operator had ―assumed sufficient control 
over that area to attempt to ensure a proper approach to the ship 
and barge terminal,‖ id. at 1327, it was deemed negligent for 
―fail[ing] to use means adequate[, such as side scans or wire drags,] 
to ensure that the new area where it thought larger barges could 
safely go was free of obstructions,‖ id. at 1325.  Control aside, the 
District of New Jersey Court also noted that a ―safe approach to the 
berth had to include the additional . . . area.‖  Id. at 1326. 
   
29
 That the appeal of The Moorcock was operating under a theory 
of an implied contractual warranty does not reduce its import for 
purposes of this analysis.  [1889] 14 P.D. 64 at 68 (Eng.).   
48 
 
with whom they have dealings that they have not 
done so. 
Id.; see also The Cornell No. 20, 8 F. Supp. 431, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 
1934) (―However, it is clear that the obligation of the wharfinger is 
not limited to the area of the land under water actually owned by 
it. . . . It impliededly [sic] represents to the master of a vessel who 
is induced to bring his vessel to its wharf that the berth and 
immediate access to it are reasonably safe for the vessel.‖).    
In addition, insofar as the sphere of responsibility exercised 
by CARCO is a voluntary assumption of duty, it cannot be relied 
on to restrict the scope of a port owner‘s duty as a matter of law.  
Limiting a wharfinger‘s responsibility to areas in which it has 
affirmatively assumed responsibility would allow it to define the 
scope of its own liability regardless of the port‘s actual approach.  
Such a construction plays poorly against a policy that places logic 
and common sense over self-serving limitations of liability in the 
tort context.  Moreover, we are not convinced that CARCO was 
actually precluded from extending its area of responsibility into the 
Anchorage.  The record reflects that permission to it was not 
required for sonar scans, for example, and the record lacks an 
indication that CARCO could not have obtained a dredging permit 
for the Anchorage if it desired to do so.               
We conclude that the Athos I was well within the approach 
to CARCO‘s terminal when the casualty occurred, and that it 
therefore had a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in providing 
the Athos I with a safe approach.   
iii.  Potential Breach of Duty to Maintain a Safe 
Approach    
Having determined that the Athos I was within its approach 
when it was damaged and that CARCO therefore owed it a safe 
approach, did CARCO satisfy that duty by exercising the standard 
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of care required of a reasonable wharfinger under the 
circumstances?  Although the ―the nature and extent of the duty of 
due care is a question of law,‖ factual issues predominate here as 
they do in most negligence litigation.  Redhead v. United States, 
686 F.2d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1982).  Thus, we review findings of 
negligence as factual findings for clear error.  See In re Moran 
Towing Corp., 497 F.3d 375, 377–78 (3d Cir. 2007); Andrews v. 
United States, 801 F.2d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1986).  As noted, there 
were no findings.      
Negligence exists where there was a ―fail[ure] to exercise 
that caution and diligence which the circumstances demanded, and 
which prudent men ordinarily exercise.‖  Grand Trunk R.R. v. 
Richardson, 91 U.S. 454, 469 (1875).  The admiralty context is no 
different, requiring ―reasonable care under the particular 
circumstances.‖  1 Schoenbaum, supra, § 5-2, at 253 (citation 
omitted); see also Smith, 173 U.S. at 436 (remarking that 
wharfingers are ―bound to use reasonable diligence‖ (citation and 
quotation marks omitted)).  In admiralty, the particular duty 
required under any given circumstance can be gleaned from statute, 
custom, or ―the demands of reasonableness and prudence.‖  1 
Schoenbaum, supra, § 5-2, at 253 (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. S.S. 
Marie Leonhardt, 202 F. Supp. 368, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff’d, 320 
F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1963)).  Of course, ―the degree of care which the 
law requires in order to guard against injury to others varies greatly 
according to the circumstances of the case.‖  Richardson, 91 U.S. 
at 469–70.      
On the facts before us, we are insufficiently informed to 
delineate the exact standard of care required by CARCO,
30
 let 
                                              
30
 In evaluating the specific nature of this duty, the parties point to 
no statute on point and our research reveals none.  As to custom, it 
―is only evidence of a standard of care[,] and violation of custom or 
adherence to it does not necessarily constitute negligence or lack of 
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alone whether there was a breach of that standard (a.k.a. duty).  
That task rests with the District Court on remand should it need to 
reach the negligence claim.  
  iv.  Causation   
On remand, the District Court will also need to determine 
whether the failure, if any, to meet the standard of care proximately 
caused the accident.  ―Questions of causation in admiralty are 
                                                                                                              
negligence.‖  In re J.E. Brenneman Co., 322 F.2d 846, 855 (3d Cir. 
1963) (citations omitted); Norton v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 412 
F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1969) (―Although not controlling, custom 
and practice may be shown to establish the standard of care to 
which the party charged with the wrongful act may be required to 
conform.‖).   
The District Court also determined that no industry custom 
would have ―put CARCO on notice that it should scan into the 
Anchorage.‖  In re Frescati, 2011 WL 1436878, at *4.  It is unclear 
if this apparent factual finding refers to other River terminals not 
searching their full approaches, federal waters generally, or 
Anchorage Number Nine specifically.  Unfortunately, a review of 
the record leaves us similarly adrift.  While several trial witnesses 
testified that they did not know of any Delaware River terminal 
taking precautionary action within federal waters, the Chief of 
Operations Division for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
suggested that at least one terminal had surveyed the federal waters 
preceding its berth.  See DePasquale Test. 104:20–105:13, Oct. 6, 
2010.  Ultimately, the record is unhelpful on this point because we 
do not know if any of the terminals on the River had an approach 
that also traversed federal waters like CARCO‘s did.  Of course, 
the only relevant consideration for custom would be similarly 
situated terminals, and we are unable to make any meaningful 
assessment of industry custom on these facts.   
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questions of fact.‖  Stolt Achievement, Ltd. v. Dredge B.E. 
LINDHOLM, 447 F.3d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 2006); see also In re 
Nautilus, 85 F.3d at 116  (reviewing, in admiralty, a district court‘s 
determination as to causation for clear error).   
 The purpose of requiring proximate cause is ―to limit the 
defendant‘s liability to the kinds of harms he risked by his 
negligent conduct.‖  1 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 198, 
at 681 (2d ed. 2011) (citations omitted).  Proximate cause is 
something of a misnomer in that it ―is not about causation at all but 
about the appropriate scope of legal responsibility.‖  Id. at 682.  
Instead, ―proximate cause holds that a negligent defendant is liable 
for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked by his 
negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that 
conduct.‖  Id. at 682–83; 1 Schoenbaum, supra, § 5-3, at 260–61 
(―[T]he injury or damage must be a reasonably probable 
consequence of the defendant‘s act or omission.‖).     
CARCO argues that proximate cause is lacking on these 
facts because the presence of an anchor in the anchorage was not 
foreseeable, especially by virtue of other ships arriving unharmed 
in the past.  Once again, we decline to resolve this issue on the 
record before us.  CARCO further argues that proximate cause is 
lacking on the basis that the anchor-dropper was the actual cause of 
the accident.  It is clear, however, ―‗that there may be more than 
one proximate cause of an injury.‘‖  Serbin v. Bora Corp., 96 F.3d 
66, 75 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Davis v. Portline Transportes Mar. 
Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 544 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
 More crucially, the issue is whether the accident would have 
been prevented had CARCO exercised its duty to act as a prudent 
wharfinger within the approach.  At a minimum, this requires ―that 
the injury would not have occurred without the defendant‘s 
negligent act.‖  1 Schoenbaum, supra, § 5-3, at 259.  Here, the 
causation inquiry turns on whether prudent behavior—had it been 
exercised, a factual inquiry—would have prevented the injury.  See 
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Dobbs et al., supra, § 184, at 620.  In light of CARCO‘s invitation 
that the Athos I arrive drafting 37 feet or less, see supra Part IV.C, 
it may be that the anchor lay sufficiently deep such that it would 
not have been detected even if CARCO had acted as a prudent 
wharfinger.  Conversely, it could be the case that—even if the 37 
feet of contractual clearance were provided—CARCO‘s duty as a 
wharfinger required something more.  Should this be put in issue, 
further inquiry must occur as to what diligence was required of a 
prudent wharfinger, and only then can the District Court determine 
whether a failure to implement those procedures proximately 
caused the accident.
31
   
Therefore, because factual issues remain to be resolved if 
Frescati‘s negligence claim becomes relevant, we also remand for 
further proceedings, as necessary, on this claim.     
B. Negligent Misrepresentation  
Frescati argues that CARCO‘s failure to inform the Athos I 
of the reduction in maximum draft at its facility‘s ship dock prior to 
the vessel‘s arrival was a negligent misrepresentation.  The District 
Court held otherwise, reasoning that ―the area of concern was not 
the area where the casualty occurred and the draft at the berth was 
factually irrelevant to the casualty.‖  In re Frescati, 2011 WL 
1436878, at *5.  We reach essentially the same result.      
Negligent misrepresentation stems from a failure to exercise 
reasonable care in supplying incorrect information during the 
course of a business transaction.  Coastal (Berm.) Ltd. v. E.W. 
                                              
31
 We note that the District Court was ―not convinced that had the 
area been scanned the anchor would perforce have been 
detected . . . .‖  In re Frescati, 2011 WL 1436878, at *4.  We 
interpret the Court‘s remark as contemplating the effort required to 
detect the anchor absent an incident, as the anchor was in fact 
discovered with the use of side-scan technology.  
53 
 
Saybolt & Co., Inc., 826 F.2d 424, 428 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing 
Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 
1986)).  The receiving party must rely on that false information and 
thereby suffer injury.  Id. at 428–29 (citing same).  This 
formulation, set out by § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
implicitly incorporates the standard elements of negligence:  duty 
of care, a breach of that duty, injury, and causation.  See J.E. 
Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fid. Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 615 (3d Cir. 
1987); 1 Schoenbaum, supra, § 5-2, at 252.     
CARCO initially explained in its Port Manual that the 
allowable maximum draft at its Paulsboro facility was 38 feet, but 
this ―may change from time to time and should be verified prior to 
the vessel‘s arrival.‖  J.A. at 1095 (CITGO Terminal Regulations 
for Vessels ¶ 2).  On November 22, 2004, four days before the 
Athos I arrived, CARCO‘s Port Captain Rankine announced 
internally that ―the maximum draft at Paulsboro berth #1 (ship 
dock) has been reduced to 36-00 feet.‖  J.A. at 1702.  No one 
informed the Athos I of the change (and apparently its personnel 
did not inquire).  This meant that the Athos I would have to enter 
CARCO‘s port under an exception to the maximum draft, and in 
any event Port Captain Rankine was comfortable with this because 
the Athos I would not be lying in the shallower area next to its dock 
that motivated the draft reduction.
32
  Rankine Test. 41:22–42:3, 
Nov. 22, 2010.     
                                              
32
 Rankine testified that such exceptions are common in the 
industry, and that he was not concerned for the Athos I because a 
ship drafting 37ʹ3ʺ had sat through low water just ten days before 
without harm.  Rankine Test. 38:22-23, 41:22–42:9, Nov. 22, 2010.  
When the trial judge inquired about the rationale for making 
regular exceptions, Rankine replied that he was required by the 
guidelines to make the reduction, but that he did not ―have any 
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On its terms, the reduction was limited to CARCO‘s ship 
dock.  Although Frescati argues that the Athos I would not have 
berthed at CARCO‘s facility (its actual ship dock, but not the 
approach to it through the Anchorage) so early in the rising tide if 
its crew had known of the reduction in maximum allowable draft, 
this is irrelevant to its decision to enter Anchorage Number Nine—
the site of the submerged anchor.   
In this context, any misrepresentation about the ship dock is 
factually irrelevant to the accident because it did not occur at the 
dock, but rather 900 feet out in the Anchorage.  There was no 
injury sustained that resulted from the failure to note the draft 
reduction at or immediately adjacent to CARCO‘s dock.  Frescati‘s 
negligent misrepresentation claim thus fails on its merits as a 
matter of law.       
VI.   Effect of the Government’s Settlement With CARCO 
In its limited settlement agreement with the Government, 
CARCO promised not to  
demand that the court reduce or offset the damages 
awarded to the United States against [CARCO] in the 
Lawsuit based on evidence that the negligence or 
fault of the United States in failing to detect, mark 
and/or remove underwater obstructions to navigation 
in the navigable waters of the Delaware River caused 
or contributed to the ATHOS I Incident.  
J.A. at 95 (Release ¶ 3.1(b)).  It thus asks us to preclude CARCO 
on remand from raising any equitable defense premised on the 
Government‘s regulation of the Anchorage.  CARCO responds that 
it retained unspecified equitable defenses relevant to defending 
                                                                                                              
worries about the depth of water in the area where the ship was 
going to sit.‖  Id. at 45:18-25.     
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against, inter alia, the contractual claims, and that the Government 
conflates defenses to these claims with violations of CARCO‘s 
promise to forbear making claims against the Government 
sounding in tort to reduce or offset damages awarded to it.
33
       
The Government also argues that the District Court 
mistakenly denied its earlier motion for summary judgment on 
CARCO‘s defense of equitable recoupment,34 as that defense was 
really just a disguised attempt for indemnity or contribution 
payments.  After hearing oral argument, the District Court denied 
the Government‘s pretrial motion on the ground ―that the question 
of subrogation defenses [by CARCO] is better resolved with the 
benefit of a full trial record.‖  J.A. at 101.  CARCO claims that the 
Government failed to follow up at trial, and thus waived the issue.  
We agree, as we see no indication that the Government renewed its 
                                              
33
 The Government argues that CARCO has attempted to 
circumvent this partial settlement agreement by presenting against 
it negligence claims couched as equitable defenses.  CARCO 
explicitly retained ―the right to raise affirmative defenses under any 
theory or doctrine of law or equity, the right to assert setoff or 
recoupment and the right to assert compulsory or non-compulsory 
counterclaims other than a Claim for Contribution or 
Indemnity . . . .‖  J.A. at 97 (Release ¶ 4.2).  It was further agreed 
that the partial settlement would have no force as to CARCO‘s suit 
with Frescati.  Id. at 97–98 (Release ¶ 4.3).   
 
34
 Equitable recoupment is ―[a] principle that diminishes a party‘s 
right to recover a debt to the extent that the party holds money or 
property of the debtor to which the party has no right.‖  Black’s 
Law Dictionary, supra, at 618.  The competing claims must arise 
from the ―same transaction.‖  Phila. & Reading Corp. v. United 
States, 944 F.2d 1063, 1075 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States 
v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990)).  
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argument at trial (or argued before us how the issue has not been 
waived).  Thus, we decline to preclude CARCO from revisiting any 
previously raised equitable defense to the Government‘s 
subrogation claims.    
VII.   Conclusion 
Although remand is appropriate because the District Court 
failed to set out separate findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), our legal 
conclusions also make it necessary to remand for factual findings.   
We conclude that the Athos I, and Frescati as its owner, are 
beneficiaries of CARCO‘s contractual safe berth warranty.  This 
was an express assurance that CARCO‘s port would be safe for the 
Athos I within the scope of its invitation—that is, drafting 37 feet 
or less.  Therefore, on remand it will need to be determined 
whether this amount of clearance was actually provided.  This 
analysis may require inquiries into the arriving draft of the Athos I 
and, if the vessel was drafting more than the agreed-upon depth of 
37 feet, the depth and positioning of the anchor.   
CARCO‘s assertion of the named port exception is 
unavailing.  Even if it were eligible on the type of notice given to 
the Athos I, its crew did not have an opportunity to accept a hazard 
(the anchor) that was unknown to the parties prior to the accident, 
and the exception is inapplicable.     
We further conclude that, as this case is primarily a 
contractual one, analysis of Frescati‘s negligence claim is required 
only if the contractual safe berth warranty of CARCO is deemed 
satisfied.  In that event, because we conclude that the accident 
occurred within the approach to CARCO‘s terminal, the District 
Court would need to determine the appropriate standard of care, 
whether it was breached, and, if so, was that breach a cause of the 
spill.  The negligent misrepresentation claim, however, fails for 
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lack of factual causation because the alleged misrepresentation 
applied to an area unrelated to the accident.    
Finally, we conclude that the Government has waived its 
reliance on its partial settlement agreement in challenging 
CARCO‘s defenses to liability.   
We thus affirm in part, vacate in part the District Court‘s 
judgment orders of April 12, 2011 against Frescati and the 
Government, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  Further appeals relating to this case will be referred to 
the current panel.   
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